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ABSTRACT 
 
In this report we reflect upon possible issues that need to be considered before embarking on creating a 
partnership or network where a main objective is the exchange of sensitive information.  
 
To this end, we try to provide a brief overview of types of information exchange partnerships, and 
suggest various aspects that those embarking on a partnership should first review.  
 
The second part of this report is devoted to highlighting operational (“soft”) issues that need to be kept 
in mind, such as national legal and regulatory frameworks and trust issues. In the third part we sketch 
some technical aspects that may have an impact. 
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Introduction 
 
In this paper we reflect upon some issues of networking and information exchange where a primary 
goal is the exchange of security related information. Some of the possible areas that may need to be 
considered are related to the notion of Private Public Partnerships (PPP), which make take different 
forms and shapes.  
 
The report is structured in three parts.  
 
• What are Information Exchange Partnerships: here we provide various views on the topic. 
• Soft aspects: this part covers issues such as legal and regulatory aspects.  
• Technical aspects; this part covers possible issues related to the supporting technologies, 
such as the security of ICT systems. 
 
In the first chapter we begin by providing some examples of the various types of networking and 
partnerships that may result form the interaction of public and private actors, and later point the reader 
to the issues, soft and technical, that we believe are most relevant. These issues can then hopefully be 
used to support the decision process when selecting the best shape for a given network or PPP 
implementation.  
 
The importance of establishing and strengthening collaborative networks and to facilitate information 
sharing in the European security domain between the private and public sectors has already been 
identified by the European Commission; see for example the following extracts from a communication 
on Public-Private Dialogue in Security Research and Innovation.  
 
Developing and implementing an effective security research strategy therefore requires the 
participation of all relevant stakeholders in the private and the public sectors, both at national 
and European levels. 
In this context, the specific policy objectives of the Private-Public Dialogue in Security 
Research and Innovation are: 
• to bring together all the relevant stakeholders in order to discuss issues of cross-
cutting, common concern, facilitate the assessment of their differentiated strengths 
and resources, identify areas for potential synergies; or joint programming; 
• to identify proposals for forming a strategic security research and innovation 
agenda, involving national and European stakeholders, laying out a shared and 
clear view of European security research needs and priorities; 
• to share ideas, views and best practices in order to make better use of existing 
capabilities and to enhance the use of technology in security-related domains, e.g. 
by inter alia making the best possible use of the various funding instruments in the 
present financial programming period.1 
 
It is hoped that this paper will help those contemplating a partnership for sensitive issues (e.g. 
information exchange) to prepare themselves, not necessarily by providing answers but rather by 
highlighting possible pitfalls. Before embarking on the creation of a multi-party and perhaps cross-
border collaboration for matters such as information exchange and its supporting systems – structure, 
process, equipment – there is a sequence of questions that should be examined. For instance, for an 
information exchange venture, the following points will be relevant: 
 
 
                                                 
1 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on Public-Private Dialogue in Security 
Research and Innovation  http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52007DC0511:EN:HTML 
• Why: what is the purpose. 
• What: what information is to be shared, what type of information, how sensitive it is, is it time 
critical? 
• Who: who are the actors that will be sharing information, will it be government – industry, 
across industry sectors, across government departments; is it on local, regional, national or 
international level? 
• Where & When: where will it be placed, when should it be active. Will the information 
sharing take place across legal and regulatory borders? 
 
It is only when the preceding questions have been satisfactorily answered that work can proceed on 
the last question:  
 
• How; how can the partnership best be structured, what supporting tools will it need and which 
issues need special attention. 
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Figure 1. Implementation space. 
 
1 What are Information Exchange Partnerships 
1.1 Partnership Categories 
1.1.1 Why Partnerships and What is shared 
In this chapter we review various categories of partnerships that may be related to information 
exchange, and suggest possible ways to view the factors influencing the chosen implementation. 
 
Depending on the role, main purpose or general mission, the best way to organise a partnership in 
order to facilitate information exchange - and the tools to use for it - may differ significantly. In this 
chapter we provide a rough sketch of some possible interaction categories and try to place information 
exchange in a basic context. 
 
Information sharing should start with a purpose, a mission. Knowing this “why”, it becomes possible 
to identify what type of information categories need to be shared, and amongst which actors. Knowing 
this, it becomes possible to start exploring exactly how the information sharing should proceed, both 
technically and methodologically.2 
 
 
                                                 
2 Richard Wilhelm summarised the context aspects for information sharing in a speech at the 2004 RSA Conference held in 
San Francisco, California. Information Sharing: http://www.boozallen.com/publications/article/659327 
 
The meaning of the term “Public Private Partnership” can vary significantly depending on context, and 
both its usage and general scope has expanded over the years. For an overview of PPP’s and their 
applicability to security issues see the JRC technical report “Is Public Private Partnership a suitable 
way to cope with security”. 
 
For the sake of identifying similarities in operation and style between partnerships Michael Geddes3 
proposes the following rough categorisation - based on whether the output is executive or advisory, 
and on the reasons behind the partnership: 
 
Strategy or policy 
development
created as a result of legislation
created to meet a common objective
delivery of public services
Statutory based 
partnerships
Voluntary based 
partnerships
Commercially or 
contractually based 
partnerships
Executive action
 
Figure 2. PPP categories based on motive and output 
 
Depending on the motive for the partnership there will usually be very varying legal, financial and 
regulatory aspects to consider, there may also be differences in the degree of trust and cooperation 
between the partners, while depending on the type of output there will usually also be large differences 
in their internal structure/organisation. 
 
Possibly the most common PPP category identifiable from the image above is the “commercially or 
contractually based partnership” which produces an “executive action”, e.g. in this category one public 
authority enters into a close partnership with one or more private industries for the sake of transferring 
to private industry the responsibility for construction and or maintenance of an infrastructure that 
provides a public service.  This type of partnership often entails complex legal and financial 
arrangements, and the European Commission has been working on facilitating this process through a 
number of initiatives and guidebooks.4 
 
A recent notable example of EC support is the European PPP Expertise Centre (EPEC), an initiative 
launched in collaboration with the European Investment Bank. Its purpose is to help public institutions 
become more effective in their PPP participation, and one means to this end is the facilitation of 
information sharing regarding experiences and best practises between the member institutions. A 
motive given for this initiative is that “experience is not systematically shared, resulting in a failure to 
learn lessons and effectively disseminate best practice. This applies both within and between 
countries.”5  
                                                 
3 Geddes, Michael. Making Public Private Partnerships Work: Building Relationships and 
Understanding Cultures, Gower Publishing, Ltd., 2005 
4 See for example: Initiative on Public Private Partnerships and Community Law on Public Procurement and Concessions 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/publicprocurement/ppp_en.htm 
Guidelines for Successful Public – Private Partnerships 
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/guides/ppp/ppp_en.pdf  
Green Paper on public-private partnerships and on Community law on public contracts and concessions, COM(2004) 327, 
30.4.2004 http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l22012.htm 
5 European Investment Bank press release, 16 September 2008, European institutions take lead on PPP expertise  
http://www.eib.org/attachments/press/2008-005-fact_sheet_epec_en.pdf 
 
This leads to the objective of this paper: information sharing, i.e. partnerships where information 
exchange either is by itself the main objective of the partnership, or where the main objective heavily 
depends on information exchange. Below follows a non exhaustive list of possible motives behind 
information exchange partnerships, i.e. reflecting on What is to be shared: 
 
• Crisis Management – such as emergency information distribution to the public – or for the sake 
of decision making and situational awareness information sharing – might be conducted 
between police, rescue services, military, medical authorities, meteorological agencies etc.  
• Data clearinghouses – they collect, store and disseminate scientific, technical, environmental, 
legal, etc information, sometimes in processed form. An example is satellite photographs 
collected from various space operators.  
• Incident reporting – such as virus info sharing 
• Warnings and Alerts networks – such as critical infrastructure warning networks   
• Educational and Awareness raising – can be used both as preparatory and for crisis 
management 
• Expert networks – which can be used for policy support 
• Law enforcement – e.g. sharing databases 
• Technology Watch  – which could: 1. identify, keep track & analyze positive/negative trends in 
security, 2. identify & analyze disruptive technologies;  3. share roadmaps/strategies6, 
Experimental Labs for testing current and proposed technical systems, verify vulnerabilities, 
simulate attacks, verify standards  
• Vulnerability data bases and disclosure: constitution by shared contributions 
• Security data bases: Archives of attacks, security events 
• Incident response and emergency management 7 
 
For the examples above it is possible to isolate some distinct differences, for instance with respect to 
the information they handle: 
• Crisis Management information:  
o Often Time-critical 
o Can require high bandwidth 
o Sources and Recipients can change dynamically 
o Stringent interoperability issues between actors 
o Information security subject to medium-level requirements (i.e. ideally it should be 
as secure as possible, but security must not interfere with operational objectives) 
• Data Clearinghouses: 
o Information is in long-term storage 
o Information needs maintenance, either by up-loader or by the clearinghouse 
• Incident Reporting: 
o Rapid response often needed 
o Low bandwidth (e.g. e-mail) 
• Warnings and Alerts: 
o Data is subject to hard time constraints 
o Data is highly sensitive  
o Authentication of sources and receivers should be strict 
• Educational and Awareness raising: 
o The focus is on the contents, and their legibility and understandability. 
o There are defined roles for the actors, with different activities 
                                                 
6 See for example Roadmap to Secure Control Systems in the Energy Sector http://energetics.com/csroadmap/ 
7 See for instance the reports discussed in: Information Sharing and Analysis Centers Council 
http://www.isaccouncil.org/pub/index.php 
• Expert Networks: 
o Authorship and recognition of sources are fundamental, with possible explicit 
requirements about confidentiality and intellectual property 
o Final output could be open to all users or dedicated to a limited set (e.g. policy 
makers) 
o End users might only access the final expert advice or have the possibility of browse 
through the discussions preceding the final results 
• Law enforcement: 
o Information is highly sensitive 
o There are severe legal constraints on how information can be processed.  
o Depending on the status of the data (e.g. related to criminal investigations), the 
tracking of all access and actions is mandatory.  
o There are strict rules on the sequence of the actions that could be exercise onto the 
information (e.g. approval by hierarchy). 
 
1.1.1 Stakeholders (Who) 
Which stakeholders are involved in a partnership will influence the form and workings of the 
partnership, some examples of configurations are given below: 
 
• Private – Private: this usually involves voluntary partnerships from Figure 2. e.g. for the 
purpose of influencing government policy. 
• Public – Private: this usually involves commercially or contractually based partnerships, but 
could also relate to actions requiring some legal setting that otherwise would not be reached 
(e.g. information sharing) 
• Public – Public: this usually involves voluntary or statutory partnerships, e.g. the EU may 
mandate that governments collaborate in certain areas, or various national government 
authorities may collaborate voluntarily. 
 
The category of participants will affect the workings of the partnership, in particular if the partnership 
involves cross-border information sharing, even crossing regional borders may cause unexpected legal 
or regulatory difficulties. Other issues to consider are antitrust legislations that may make private 
partners reluctant to share information, competitive considerations, and trust issues. Trust and legal 
issues are further reviewed in a succeeding section. 
 
The involvement of public authorities in a partnership can range from passive roles (e.g. sponsor, 
guarantor, mentor, proponent, etc.), to other more active ones (e.g. command and control, chairing, 
etc.). When a public authority chooses an active role in the partnership, it usually has two main 
responsibilities:  
 
1. Coordination or secretariat (which result in the definition of the agenda, on the distribution of 
responsibilities and resources, in the acceptance of the results, etc.); 
2. Leading by example, i.e. to be an active participant and a good user of the forums/support-tools 
provided. 
1.1.2 Organizational examples 
In this chapter we provide a short description of some partnerships based on information sharing, in 
order to show the wide the range of organisation forms. 
  
Data Clearinghouse: 
The Biosafety Clearing-House8 is an information exchange mechanism established under the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. This protocol governs a wide range of issues related to genetically 
modified organisms (GMO), such as export procedures, human health etc. The Clearinghouse has two 
missions; serve as a platform for sharing experience and information on GMO, and to help government 
authorities to implement the protocol regulations. Its stakeholders include not only government but 
also industry and academia, which use it to share information and shape regulations. 
 
Interesting aspects of this organisation are that it implements a common terminology on the documents 
and that information is owned by the government that uploaded it ― i.e. that the uploading 
government authority is responsible for the maintenance and update of the information, as well as for 
ensuring its accuracy. 
 
Crisis Management 
 
During emergency situations such as natural disasters or terrorist attacks it is important to for decision 
makers, both at tactical and operational levels, to quickly obtain a cross-sector situation picture. This 
requires the sharing of both information and services between civilian - and also military – actors on 
both national and international levels. Technical experiments demonstrating the feasibility of this in 
Europe are ongoing.9 
 
In the information and communication technologies domain, we can single out the US-CERT:10 The 
United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT) is a partnership between the 
Department of Homeland Security and the public and private sectors. Established in 2003 to protect 
the nation's Internet infrastructure, US-CERT coordinates defense against and responses to cyber 
attacks across the nation. It coordinates defense against and response to cyber attacks, getting 
connected to many parties in private and public organizations. US-CERT is responsible for  
• analyzing and reducing cyber threats and vulnerabilities  
• disseminating cyber threat warning information  
• coordinating incident response activities 
 
Expert Network, Social clubs and Network of peers 
 
AVIEN, the Anti-Virus Information Exchange Network11 had its informal inception amongst some of 
the participants to an Anti-Virus conference in late 2000. They shared the desire to learn from each 
other without constraints. This led to the ad-hoc creation of a closed, private network of specialists that 
help each other with news and advice daily. It also later led to the creation of the Anti-Virus 
Information & Early Warning System (AVIEWS), which expanded the scope to encompass not only 
people in large organizations, but vendors and smaller organizations as well. 
 
                                                 
8 Kirsty GALLOWAY MCLEAN, Bridging the gap between researchers and policy-makers: International collaboration 
through the Biosafety Clearing-House. http://dx.doi.org/10.1051/ebr:2005017, See also 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Biosafety_Clearing-House 
9 For example: Sweden and NATO Joint Live Experiment NEC Network Enabled Capability. September 24-25, 2008 
http://sweden-nato-nec.nc3a.nato.int 
10 For more information see United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team   http://www.us-cert.gov 
11 Anti Virus Information Exchange Network. http://www.avien.net 
A network with more formal origins and structure is “The Cyber Security Knowledge Transfer 
Network”12 which sees itself and its mission as “the single focal point for UK Cyber Security expertise, 
to collaboratively identify universal challenges and develop effective response, influence UK 
investment strategy and government policy, accelerate innovation and education, harness and promote 
UK capability internationally and help improve the UK security baseline.” 
 
Cavnet13 is an example of a network evolved out of a pressing need and access to social networking 
tools. During the 2003 Iraq war junior U.S. officers on their own developed and deployed a private 
network to quickly exchange combat information such as reports about enemy troop movements 
amongst themselves. Although initially concerned about information security issues and loss of 
control, the Department of Defence (DoD) took on the idea and formally developed Cavnet for this 
purpose. 
 
1.2 Degrees of Interaction (How) 
In partnerships engaged in information exchange you can achieve varying “degrees” of interaction and 
sharing depending on the structure and purpose of the partnership. The table below lists some 
examples.14   
 
 
Category Purpose Methods Uses 
Information sharing Data exchange, networking VoIP, e-mail, file-
sharing 
Sharing of best 
practices 
Coordination Regulated interaction Project 
management, 
decision support 
Responsibilities 
allocation 
Cooperation Working together, often 
towards a common goal 
Wikipedia, 
discussion forums 
Generation of trust 
Collaboration Genuine cooperative 
problem solving, working 
jointly with others on a 
common goal that is beyond 
what any one partner can 
accomplish alone 
Brainstorming Political decision 
making, 
Policy making 
Table 1. Example of levels of interaction15 
 
The stronger the common goal(s) is, the deeper the degree and complexity of interaction and mutual 
trust. 
 
Whatever the definitions of collaboration, coordination etc, a fundamental part of them is the exchange 
of information; depending on the type and degree of interaction the methods for information exchange, 
as well as the type of information exchanged, will vary. Various degrees of collaboration can be 
associated with specific tools and methods16, and each increase in the level of interaction adds a layer 
of complexity and requires additional support from tools and structures (organisation / process / 
methodology) to aid the interaction. 
                                                 
12 The Cyber Security Knowledge Transfer Network. http://www.ktn.qinetiq-tim.net 
13 Congressional Research Service (CSR) Report for Congress Avatars, Virtual Reality Technology, and the U.S. Military: 
Emerging Policy Issues  
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22857.pdf 
14 Note, there are differences in literature on which of Coordination or Cooperation signify a deeper interaction. 
15 The table is an adaptation from  Peter J. Denning and Peter Yaholkovsky, The Profession of IT”; Getting to “We”: 
Solidarity, not software, generates collaboration, Communications of the ACM, April 2008/Vol. 51, No. 4 
16 E.g. the “Delphi method” if the purpose is Technology Foresight. 
 
At the deepest levels of interaction, where it is not only information but also knowledge (see chapter 
1.4) that is being shared, a good understanding of the partner’s way of working (their organisational 
culture) is needed. Some aspects touching on the latter are presented in chapter 3.1 which examines 
interoperability. 
 
1.3 Implementation (How) 
 
There are various ways to structure a partnership or network; in this chapter we briefly list some 
aspects impacting on structure. 
 
Financing and legal issues;  
 
• The network or partnership will likely be a legal entity, the structure of which can take various 
forms, e.g. limited liability partnership. 
• The partnership or network will need funding, at a minimum to pay for communication 
equipment/software and administration. In some cases the partnership or network can generate 
its own revenues. How income/funding are to be acquired, used and accounted for must be 
defined. 
• Laws and regulations, on partnerships and on information exchange (such as privacy laws) will 
affect the structure and processes. 
 
Admission and Membership 
 
In some cases it will be self evident who the members will be, or at least which key members must 
participate for the information sharing to be meaningful. In other cases, depending on its goals, this 
may not be as clear cut. 
 
• What are the criteria that members must fulfil to be eligible to participate? 
• Inclusiveness is usually a good thing, but too many members may lead to unwieldiness and 
lack of trust. 
• Should the partnership strive for a numerical balance between interest groups, e.g. public and 
private partners? 
• What will the power structure be, e.g. if the partnership is steered by votes then private partners 
may be reluctant to participate if they can be outvoted by NGO’s.  
 
Roles and responsibilities 
 
• If the partnership is expected to produce anything beyond a “social club” then there will have 
to be roles, responsibilities, and enforcement mechanisms, all geared to the purposes of the 
partnership. 
• Regardless of the type of organisation there will have to be at least a minimum level of 
coordination and administration. 
 
Supporting technologies and methodologies/processes 
 
• The network/partnership will have to operate under a number of legal and regulatory 
frameworks (administrative/financial/information exchange specific). Work processes and 
other business practises will have to be set up to ensure that the applicable laws are followed. 
• The equipment in support of information exchange, and other associated tasks, will have to be 
selected and maintained. The technical requirements on this equipment will vary depending on 
objective, but may include aspects such as security, bandwidth, and storage space. 
• Work processes and methodologies will need to be selected and adapted. 
• Security and other processes will need to be adapted to the information security concerns of all 
members. 
• In some cases it might be foreseeable that the mission or size of the partnership will change 
over time, in which case adaptable or easily replaceable processes and technologies should be 
selected from the start with this in mind. 
1.4 An operational view of information sharing 
 
In this chapter we use some terms commonly used in the military and business sector in order to 
identify some noteworthy aspects of information sharing. 
 
When discussing information exchange it should be kept in mind that there is a hierarchy of at least 4 
classes of “information”. 
 
• Data; the bits and bytes 
• Information; processed, structured, and or summarised data. E.g. an incident report. 
• Knowledge; correlated, analysed information.  
• Understanding; knowledge is integrated with previous experience. We become aware of the 
issues and what is going on, and can extrapolate. We can visualise the situation. 
 
In particular the difference between data and information is of interest, since to be useful the latter 
requires that the user understand how it is structured and other implicit information such as semantics 
and terminology. These issues are further explored in the chapter on interoperability. 
 
In order to understand the purpose of various partnerships designed for information change, especially 
those dealing with real-time or close to real time information it is worthwhile to examine some ways 
that information may be used. The OODA loop, commonly used in military and business strategy, can 
be used for context. 
 
OODA
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Figure 3.  The OODA-loop. Decision making occurs in a recurring cycle of observe-orient-decide-act. 
 
• OBSERVE, collect the needed information. 
• ORIENT, organise, interpret or process the new information. E.g. create a model of the 
situation based on the collected information. The processing will be affected by previously 
collected information, your education, culture, previous experience etc. 
• DECIDE, based on the new understanding, e.g. similarity with previous experiences, evaluate 
options and make a choice.  
• ACT, implement the decisions, i.e. give orders, propose legislation etc. 
 
New observations, possibly as a result of the chosen actions, will result in new decisions and so forth 
in a continuous loop. 
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Figure 4 . The Intelligence Cycle. 
 
The Intelligence cycle is in some respects analogous to the OODA loop, and is for the information 
exchange purpose more pertinent.  
 
• DIRECT, decide what category of information that is needed, and on which topics. 
• COLLECT, using available sources - Internet, partnerships, etc – gather the required 
information. 
• PROCESS, structure and evaluate the collected information, e.g. its reliability and relevance. 
Can you trust the source, is it conflicting with other information? Interpret the information. 
• DISSEMINATE, provide the information or knowledge (conclusions) to those in need using 
pertinent means – e-mail, PPPs etc, e.g. warnings of Internet attacks to CERTS, proposals for 
research policy directions to politicians etc.   
 
The cycles above are applicable for placing information exchange partnerships in context, in particular 
when the exchange of information has a specific goal, when something it to be produced or achieved, 
and particularly when time is short, such as in the case of partnerships for crisis management. 
 
One aspect that can be highlighted from the above images is the issue of dissemination. In order for 
decision makers - whatever their level - to be able to orient themselves about any given situation or 
topic area, they need to be provided with the appropriate information.  Thus partnerships should not 
only be seen as a means for accessing information, they are also a means for distributing and in some 
cases also processing information. In order to connect the above 2 cycles to the realities of PPP the 
following, slightly forced, example is given: 
 
The first Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) at Carnegie Mellon University was 
formed under U.S. Government contract in response to the increase in Internet viruses and 
worms. Today there are many national CERT/CSIRTs17 who collaborate by exchanging 
information on best practises and new threats. 
                                                 
17 CERT: Resource for National CSIRTs 
http://www.cert.org/csirts/national/ 
 
When identifying a new threat a CERT is dependent on reports and warnings to reach them, for 
example from the network of IDS sensors across Europe set up by The European CSIRT 
Network.18  
 
When a new threat or warning has been received by a CERT it must be integrated with other 
warnings and reports for the purpose of creating an understanding of the nature of the threat, 
the possible consequences, and which counter measures that may be applicable. Partnerships of 
relevance to the creation of such a situational awareness are for example: 
 
• Collaboration through information exchange with other national CERT;  
• Partnerships for the training of the operators who have to draw the conclusions;  
• The use of Data repositories, for example clearing houses, to access supporting 
information. 
 
2 Soft Aspects 
 
By “soft” aspects we in principle refer to the context the information exchange partnership/network is 
working within, but excluding the technical aspects such as technical platforms – topics dealt with in 
the section on “technical aspects”. The issues in this section include laws and regulations, trust, and 
information focused aspects such as quality. Topics not explored here include financing and fund 
management, since there is no apparent difference between information sharing and other generic 
partnerships in this respect. 
 
2.1 Legal Commercial and Regulatory Issues 
 
Some semi-recent studies highlight the impact that legal issues may have on partnerships.1920 Before 
initiating a partnership it is important to investigate the legal and regulatory implications. Aside from 
laws and regulations that affect the choice of financing and organisational form of the partnership, e.g. 
limited liability corporation or public company, there will also be a host of issues to consider regarding 
the information exchange itself.  
 
Note that when the information crosses legal jurisdictions, such as European national – and possibly 
also regional21 – borders, the number of laws and regulations that need to be investigated by the 
partnership are multiplied. The legal domiciles of the organisations involved will also be a factor that 
has to be considered. Some examples of the legal areas that can be involved are given below. 
 
• Administrative law: this will affect which partnerships the public partner can engage in, and 
how. 
                                                 
18 The European CSIRT Network.  http://www.ecsirt.net/ 
19 In 2002, Two workshops were held by a project investigating European “Information Infrastructure Dependability”  
DSI Public-Private Cooperation Workshop Report: Warning and Information Sharing: Technical, Legal and commercial 
Issues. http://www.ddsi.org/htdocs/DDSI/Events/Bxl/DDSI_D8A_WIS_WS_Report_WP.pdf  
DSI Public-Private Cooperation Workshop Report: the Public-Private Cooperation approach to Information Infrastructure 
Dependability. http://www.ddsi.org/htdocs/DDSI/Stockholm/DDSI_D9A_PPC_WS_Report_WP.pdf 
20 S. D. Personick, C.A. Patterson, Eds. “Critical Information Infrastructure Protection and the Law”, The National 
Academies Press. 2003. http://www.nap.edu 
21 E.g. the Flemish parliament has the power to regulate partnerships, see Flemish Public Private Partnership (PPP) 
Knowledge Centre: Legislative framework. http://www2.vlaanderen.be/pps/english/legislative_eng.html 
• Commercial (antitrust law): private companies exchanging information risk violating 
competition laws, e.g. restraint of trade. 
• Data protection laws: e.g. in Sweden there are strict limits on what information that may be 
shared even within departments of a government authority, let alone between separate Swedish 
authorities.22 
• Privacy laws:23 e.g. partnerships involving the exchange of medical records face strict legal 
limits. 
• Liability laws: e.g. might be relevant if some harm is caused to a 3rd party due to inaccuracies 
in the information shared by a partner or in the information produced by the partnership, or if a 
partner shares information about a product or service weakness that if exposed may be used in 
lawsuits or criminal proceedings against the partner. 
• Intellectual property laws: who owns the potentially valuable shared information, and who 
owns the end-product if the shared information is further processed? 
• Criminal law: Some information may be prohibited to transfer across national boundaries, i.e. 
information classified as “sensitive information“ or “restricted technology”, e.g. bio-safety 
information or crypto algorithms.24  There are may also be legal requirements regarding 
logging of information exchange and the storage of such logs for access by law enforcement 
agencies. In some jurisdictions the possession of certain categories of information may itself be 
a punishable offence, e.g. virus source code. 
• Public procurement law: i.e. if the partnership provides a government authority with 
information, and the government in some way compensates the partnership for this then public 
procurement laws may become applicable. 
• Lawful interception: while this does not seem to be an issue for private networks, the laws 
differ between countries, are evolving, and could affect the choice of communications 
equipment.25  
 
What laws and regulations that affect the partnership will depend on the partners involved, which 
political borders the information crosses, and the type of information that is being shared between the 
partners. After investigating these factors, and if the partnership is still considered to be possible, 
business practises and processes need to be established to ensure conformity with all applicable laws 
and regulations. These processes also need to take account any privacy concerns the partners may have 
as a result of their business practises, i.e. in order to maintain their trust in the partnership. 
 
Of particular interest for the issue of trust are the various national equivalents to the U.S. “Freedom of 
Information Act”, whereby the public is given the legal right to access information held by their 
government unless the information has been explicitly exempted through security classification or 
other means. In Sweden the closest equivalent is the Swedish Freedom of the Press Act, where it is 
stated that “every Swedish subject shall have free access to official documents.” What is deemed an 
official document extends for example also to the correspondence of the Prime Minister.26 
 
                                                 
22 In Sweden the secrecy laws give a government authority the right to deny a request for information from other Swedish 
government authorities. 
23 The EU Data Protection Directive 95/46/EC establishes a regulatory framework that tries to balance between the 
protection for the privacy of individuals and the free movement of personal data within the European Union, while the 
ePrivacy Directive 2002/58/EC provides complementary regulations. 
24 Council Regulation 1334/2000 covers dual-use technology and “intangible transfers of technology” that can take place 
for example over e-mail or telephone. 
25 Duffy, Jim. Higher ed fears wiretapping law Network World , 05/01/2006 
http://www.networkworld.com/news/2006/050106-calea.html 
26 Banisar, David. Freedominfo.org Global Survey of Freedom of Information and Access to Government Record Laws 
around the world. May 2004. http://www.freedominfo.org/documents/global_survey2004.pdf 
This type of legislation may cause apprehension amongst partners that information shared by them in 
confidence may be released due to the laws and regulations that other partners are obliged to operate 
under. In a 2003 report the GAO revealed that: 
 
“For example, neither the IT nor the energy or the water ISACs share their libraries with the 
federal government because of concerns that information could be released under FOIA. And, 
officials of the energy ISAC stated that they have not reported incidents to NIPC because of 
FOIA and antitrust concerns.”27 
 
In short, an important obstacle to overcome when dealing with information exchange is the task of 
understanding the sometimes multiple and possibly conflicting legal and regulatory frameworks that 
the partnership will be obliged to operate under. If there is confusion regarding the interpretation of the 
laws, or contradictions between national laws and jurisdictions this may not only slow down the 
formation of a partnership, it may also cause reluctance amongst partners to release relevant 
information. 
2.2 Handling of Sensitive Information 
 
When handling sensitive information there are usually at least the following three aspects to consider. 
 
• Information designation 
• Processes for safeguarding the information 
• Processes for dissemination of information 
 
By designation we mean the process whereby the information is assigned a value on the “sensitivity” 
scale. A designation usually has a name, e.g. “CONFIDENTIAL”, “SECRET” or “For Internal Use 
Only”, and a definition explaining what the designation actually means, e.g. that if leaked the 
information can lead to significant costs for a company, or endanger international relations. 
 
Processes for safeguarding information can comprise the training and assignment of staff responsible 
for carrying out designation or re-designation and the processes to be followed for protecting the 
information, e.g. a very simplified fictitious example of the rules that may apply: 
• “COMPANY CONFIDENTIAL” information must not be sent by unencrypted e-mail, copied 
on photocopiers with an internal hard-disk, and must be kept in a locked drawer when not in 
use if stored on a portable format;   
• “SECRET” information may require that both the company and those employees with access 
to the information have received a security clearance by the appropriate national police 
authorities, that printouts be kept in safe-boxes and audited, and that any electronic copies be 
kept on computer systems or other media galvanically separated from computer systems 
connected to the Internet.  
 
Processes for dissemination of information include the rules to be followed when a government 
authority receives a request for information from another government authority or the equivalent of a 
“Freedom of Information Act” request from a member of the public. The workflow may include 
examining the risk-factors involved in releasing the information, evaluating the legal grounds for 
releasing the information versus the legal grounds for protecting the information. 
 
“Facility Security Clearance (FSC)”: For information classified as CONFIDENTIAL and above the 
United Kingdom maintains a “List X” company list of those organisations, mostly from the defence 
                                                 
27 HOMELAND SECURITY: Information Sharing Responsibilities, Challenges, and Key Management Issues, May 2003. 
GAO-03-715T. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03715t.pdf 
industry, that are authorised to receive information of importance to national security. This may 
involve amongst other things periodically certified compliance with rules and procedures regarding 
perimeter protection, computer security, and procedures for the secure handling of classified 
information. 
 
Each organisation that intends to participate in a partnership where it will be expected to release 
potentially sensitive information with others will face a problem similar to that faced by governments 
who have to create and maintain the equivalents of a “List X”; how to ensure that the recipients of the 
information will handle it at least as securely as the originator. This may involve costly and time 
consuming investigations of the security arrangements of all the partners, provided that the partners are 
at all willing to allow such outside investigation of their internal operating procedures.  
 
One issue that was discovered in a 2006 U.S. survey of federal government agencies was that 56 
separate designations were being used for sensitive but unclassified information: 
 
“For example, one agency uses the Protected Critical Infrastructure Information designation, 
which has statutorily prescribed criteria for applying, sharing and protecting the information, 
whereas 13 agencies designate information For Official Use Only, which does not have 
similarly proscribed criteria. Sometimes agencies used different labels and handling 
requirements for similar information and, conversely, similar label and handling requirements 
for very different kinds of information”28 
 
A large part of the surveyed agencies reported difficulties sharing information, and the Department of 
Homeland Defence reported that on occasion shared sensitive information had been posted on the 
Internet or in other ways compromised by its partners “potentially revealing possible vulnerabilities to 
business competitors”. 
 
Partly as a consequence of this the U.S. is currently implementing the Information Sharing 
Environment (ISE) which includes: 
 
“steps towards standardizing procedures for managing, handling, and disseminating sensitive 
but unclassified information – information that is generally restricted from public disclosure 
but not designated as classified national security information – as well as protecting 
information privacy.”29  
 
In May 2008 the “Controlled Unclassified Information Office” (CUIO) within the U.S. National 
Archives and Records Administration was created, its main responsibilities lies in developing and 
enforcing the procedures for common designations.30  
 
It seems not wholly unreasonable to assume that a similar lack of standardisation in designation and 
handling of unclassified but sensitive information exists across European national agencies and 
authorities, as well as a similar lack of standardisation in in-house designations and handling 
procedures within the private sectors. 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 GAO report. Information Sharing, March 2006. GAO-06-385. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06385.pdf 
29 GAO report. Information Sharing Environment, June 2008. GAO-08-492 http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08492.pdf 
30 Press Release Archivist of the United States Establishes "Controlled Unclassified Information Office, May 22, 2008 
http://www.archives.gov/press/press-releases/2008/nr08-107.html 
2.3 Quality 
“Information sharing is only as valuable as the information shared.”31 
 
The factors determining the “Quality” or “Validity” of information can amongst other variables for 
example depend on the category of information, and to which purpose it is to be used. It can typically 
be affected by the following attributes: 
 
• Timeliness; The value of a discrete information item usually decreases over time, how rapidly 
this happens depends on the context, e.g. for crisis management or alert networks the time-span 
can be very short. Being able to receive information while it is still possible to act upon it is 
thus an important aspect. Conversely, being able to trust the recipient system or recipient 
partner to receive and act upon the information in time can be of importance to the sender. 
• Accuracy; The accuracy of information can be decreased by factors such as, misinterpretation, 
unreliable sources, obsolescence and deliberate misinformation. 
• Relevancy: If the shared information is not of relevance to the receiver, or if it is redundant, i.e. 
the recipient is already receiving the same or similar information from other sources. This type 
of lack of coordination can lead to inefficiency and risk overwhelming the recipient. 
• Provenance: Where did the information originate, how was it collected/created (using which 
methodology), how was it verified? 
 
One aspect of quality management is the ownership of data, i.e. with whom the responsibility for 
quality control and possibly also for updating the data lies. The problems with keeping the information 
up-to-date increases with distributed systems where information is stored and replicated in multiple 
locales. 
 
Poor quality Information can lead to loss of trust and to inefficiencies, and may also lead to legal 
consequences if it directly or indirectly causes harm to a 3rd party. Before putting received information 
to use it is therefore important to have an estimate of its quality. 
 
2.4 Analysis and Processing 
 
In some cases it is just as important to analyse and process the information as it is to share it. There are 
two separate aspects to this, one at the sending and one at the receiving end. 
 
1. The organisation sharing the information may, depending on the type of partnership(s) it is 
involved in, need to perform any one of a number of operations on the information it has available. 
For example: 
 
• Determining if an information item is of relevance for sharing and if so with which partners. 
• If the potential sharing is in response to an external information request, legal and policy issues 
will need to be examined, e.g. possible negative consequences from sharing the information. 
•  Legal and policy issues: Are there legal grounds for withholding a specific information item, 
are there legal grounds mandating the release of the information? Are there internal policies to 
be followed when deciding whether to release the information? 
• Depending on the topic competencies of the recipient organisation(s) and the level of hierarchy 
at which it wilt be dealt with at the receiving end, the information may need pre-
processing/tailoring for it to be useful to the recipient. This is separate from the more generic 
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issue of interoperability regarding communications equipment, data formats, semantic 
definitions, terminologies and languages. 
• Updating already shared information may be of importance, e.g. if it is provided to a data 
clearing house, then any changes may need to be monitored to ensure the quality of the data 
that is provided by the clearing house. 
 
2. The receiving organisation may typically either be an end-user (information consumer), or a 
way-station on the path to the end-users; such as a data clearing house (information maintainer and 
provider), or a fusion node or analysis centre (information processing). Some of the issues related 
to the latter two (clearing house or fusion nodes) are: 
 
• Quality control, e.g. based on reliability of the source and the consistency of the 
information with related information from other sources. 
• Maintenance, i.e. ensure that the information is up to date. 
• Standardising, i.e. modifying the information so that it conforms to a common format, be it 
with regards to terminology, semantics, data format, presentation format. 
• Indexing, e.g. applying meta-data for enabling searches. 
• Analysis, e.g. data fusion, pattern extraction, data mining. 
 
In some cases analysis may be costly, requiring dedicated visualisation systems and operator training, 
e.g. for SAR imagery analysis. 
 
The quality of an analysis can be affected by its perceived trustworthiness. Factors that may influence 
this include potential conflicts of interest, i.e. that the output is biased by the interests of the 
organisations conducting the analysis. Possible remedies include transparency in the process, use of 
standardized methodologies, standard terminologies, and standardised sets of evaluation factors. 
  
2.5 Trust  
 
Trust influences information sharing in various manners, means different things depending on context 
and is correspondingly affected by a number of variables. 
2.5.1 What is trust 
 
What do we mean by trust? Here we limit ourselves to three simple and partly interdependent domains; 
trust in the “system”, trust in the partners, and trust in the information. 
 
• System: the word “system” is here intended to denote the context surrounding the information 
exchange. It includes issues such as:  
o Laws and regulations, how they are interpreted and the perceptions they generate, e.g. 
uncertainties or misinterpretations.  
o Agreements, on confidentiality or equitable sharing, and perceptions of how reliable 
and long-term they are. 
o The structure of the organisation, e.g. network of peers or hierarchical with roles 
responsibilities and enforcement; distribution of power amongst the participants. 
o The information sharing technical platform, this includes the perceived information 
protection offered by the ICT equipment, its reliability and ease of use (e.g. “single 
sign-on”). 
 
• Partners: where partners denote both the organisation with which information is being shared, 
and the individuals representing those organisations. Trust in the latter case is of particular 
importance in close collaborative partnerships. 
o Partners perceived ability to protect sensitive or confidential information 
o Perception that partners will not use the shared information in ways contrary to the 
interests of the originator. 
o Conflicts of interests within the partnership 
o Perception that partners will keep confidentiality promises. 
o Perception that partners will reciprocate with information of equal value. 
 
• Information: Trust in the information is closely coupled both to partners and system, but some 
aspects may merit highlight nevertheless. 
o The Quality and Accuracy of the information will influence the degree to which it is 
possible to act upon the information or use it for further processing. 
o The Methodology used to derive the information will influence the degree to which the 
quality can be assessed. 
o The original source and, in the case of processed or amalgamated information, chain of 
sources will influence the degree of trust, e.g. the likelihood that relevant information is 
accidentally misinterpreted or has been intentionally withheld, that information has 
been selectively shared in order to produce a false impression, that bias 
(commercial/political) amongst those performing information processing has led to a 
skewed information product. 
 
Is trust needed? 
 
This would tend to depend on the type of information exchange that is involved, i.e. how sensitive the 
information is, and for what purpose the information is being shared. A network where merely best 
practises are shared may not even require encrypted communications, while collaborative projects 
using classified information or where partners need to be explicit about their needs and motivations 
will require a high degree of trust to be effective as they otherwise may hold a mutual fear of 
exploitation by the other part. Generally speaking, the closer the partnership has to be, i.e. the further 
down a partnership can be placed in the list provided in “Table 1. Example of levels of interaction” the 
greater the importance of trust will be. 
 
What are the effects of trust on information sharing? 
 
Low or absent trust will impede not only the sharing of sensitive information, but also the use to which 
any shared information can be put to by the recipient. 
 
How is trust to be established? 
 
Trust often takes time to develop and is then the result of a history of successful interactions between 
individuals or organisations. The generation of trust can involve tools such as contracts, reputation 
models, regular – preferably face-to-face – interactions between individuals and so forth.  
 
Note that trust is only a  part of the issue; the partners also need to have an incentive for participating 
and contributing e.g. visible benefits such as something to be gained, be it in terms of reputation, 
ideological or financial gain. 
 
 
2.5.2 Concerns 
 
We provide below a listing of trust related concerns amongst the public and private sectors found 
during the literature review. 
 
• Inadvertent exposure: 
o Exposure of corporate secrets 
o Weaknesses and vulnerabilities known to the general public can lead to consumer 
confidence being eroded 
o Loss of control over the information, over how it is used and with whom it may be 
further shared. 
• Use of shared information 
o Revealing weaknesses and vulnerabilities to a public partner may lead to additional 
regulations 
o Revealing weaknesses and vulnerabilities to a private partner may lead to commercial 
exploitation 
• Unknowns 
o Could lead to unexpected legal consequences, e.g. from liability or anti-trust laws. 
o Recipients of the information may lack the required expertise to properly understand the 
information and draw the “right” conclusions. 
• Fairness 
o In some cases creation of information involves a direct cost, or the information has an 
inherent value for other reasons. If there is a perception that the partners do not 
reciprocate with information of equal value, i.e. if there are “free loaders”, there might 
be decreased incentive to participate. 
• Confidence 
o Public partners might not be seen as reliable on promises of long term confidentiality. 
E.g. events such as 9/11 may cause policy changes. 
o Lack of confidence in the security aspects of equipment used by the network to store 
and transmit the sensitive information. 
• Control 
o By sharing information with certain partners, other partners may in turn stop sharing 
with you due to concerns about the further spread of their data. (this is of particular 
concern when dealing with international sharing of classified information, but is to 
varying degrees relevant in other cases too). 
o In some cases the issue of government inter agency competition has been raised, 
especially where the missions of the agencies overlap there may be a perceived loss of 
prestige and control from sharing information. 
o Information superiority is one of the tools needed for gaining influence, thus sharing 
information may lead to decreased leverage. 
 
 
3 Technical Aspects 
The issues that receive a cursory investigation in this chapter range from infrastructure issues to the 
role of semantics. The purpose is not to do an in-depth investigation of how to build secure and 
interoperable communications systems, but rather to highlight some issues relevant to secure 
information exchange partnerships. 
 
3.1 Interoperability 
Interoperability means the ability of information and communication technology (ICT) systems and of 
the business processes they support to exchange data and to enable the sharing of information and 
knowledge.32 
 
Definitions of interoperability vary, the example given above was chosen as most appropriate since it 
is used by Interoperable Delivery of European eGovernment Services (IDABC). 
 
When organisations with different backgrounds, such as business areas or cultures, wish to interact 
then the question of interoperability comes into play. It is necessary that the technical equipment 
possessed by the two organisations is made compatible enough to share information, or that they 
acquire common equipment. It is also a precondition that the information itself can fit in the recipient’s 
business processes. 
 
In this chapter we try to provide a sample of possible interoperability issues related to information 
exchange. 
 
Semantics 
 
When exchanging information much of the exchange is implicit, i.e. it is useful only if the recipient 
possesses the necessary background information necessary to interpret it. In a very simplified form, 
this is what communication standards are all about. 
 
To exemplify with a fictitious message:  
“COM/2005/059733 requires that you use SQL”.  Date: 2007:03:03:12:00 Name: Mihai Simon 
 
The first standard that is obvious here is the spoken language, i.e. “U.S. English”. The second notable 
aspect is the use of acronyms and designations. The reader is expected to know that it is a specific 
Communication from the European Commission, and it is also expected that “SQL” be interpreted as 
“Structured Query Language” and that it refers to a database computer language designed for the 
retrieval and management of data in relational database management systems. Other notable aspects 
are the inclusion of “Date” and “Name”. Unless we know the semantic significance of “Date” and 
“Name” in this context then that particular information becomes useless. Is it the “date” the 
information was first created, date it was sent, or date it was received? Is the “name” the name of the 
sender or recipient? Does the family name come first or last? 
 
Sometimes organisations, even departments within the same government authority, will tend to 
develop their own nomenclature, possibly using similar designations but assigning differing meaning 
to them.  
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33 Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on improved effectiveness, enhanced 
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At the highest levels we have languages, terminologies and semantics that need to be common for both 
sender and receiver (or clearly translated) for the information exchange to be meaningful. We also 
have the issue of interoperable business practises and formats. If two organisations wish to collaborate 
on measuring economic progress in a country, but one bases its statistics on GDP, while the other 
works on GNP, then simply pooling the databases of the two organisations will do neither any good, 
i.e. the information must first be adapted to the recipients’ ways of working, or the ways of working 
need to be streamlined. 
 
Standards 
 
Closer to the application layer, the hardware-boxes that perform the actual information sharing, we 
have a separate set of interoperability issues. The layers in the partly obsolete OSI model are presented 
in Table 2 below to show the various layers where common standards may be needed for an 
information exchange to be possible. 
 
 
OSI Model 
 Data Unit Layer Function 
7. Application  Network process to 
application 
6. Presentation  Data representation and 
encryption 
Data 
5. Session  Interhost 
communication 
Host Layers 
Segment/Datagram   4. Transport   End to end connections 
and reliability 
Packet  3. Network  Path determination and 
logical addressing 
Frame  2. Data Link  Physical addressing 
(MAC & LLC) 
Media 
layers 
Bit  1. Physical  Media, signal and 
binary transmission 
Table 2. Open Systems Interconnection Basic Reference Model (OSI Model)34 
 
There are a number of issues that may come into play here. Looking at an area revolving around the 
physical layer we for example find the issue of radio spectrum allocation and waveforms. Rescue 
services seeking interoperability, i.e. if police and fire-fighters at an accident scene wish to 
communicate they may, depending on communications equipment procurement policies, be forced to 
resort to using their personal cellular phones, this since the two organisations may be using different 
radio communication technologies.35 
 
Another issue that may come into play is “proprietary systems”, i.e. if a vendor has supplied a full 
system (including databases, presentation and communications equipment) then it is unlikely that it 
will be compatible with the systems of competitors unless it specifically was designed to follow open 
standards. Sharing information in such cases will involve the possibly costly design and incorporation 
of “bridges” that translate the information between the systems. Proprietary systems might have some 
security advantages thanks to this though. 
 
Government departments – and others – wishing to easily be able to share their data with other 
authorities need to consider which standards they implement, from the lowest to the highest levels, 
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from how they store their data to how it is presented to how it is transmitted. Unfortunately there are 
many standards out there, and choosing the right ones when building the system can be difficult 
without an overarching policy that points all interested in sharing to a single set of architectural 
components, standards and protocols. 
3.2 Security 
In this chapter we describe some of the technical aspects related to the security of transmitted 
information, i.e. as it relates to the technical platform. It should be noted that technology is only part of 
the issue, physical security such as perimeter guards and employee background investigations, 
training, and security-policies and guidelines play an equally important and complementary role.  
 
What level of information assurance that will be needed will depend on the type of partnership, the 
threat to the information and naturally also economic considerations. 
 
What platforms will security considerations be applied to? 
 
This will depend on the needed level of information assurance, and which platforms the network 
needs. A rough example of which categories of platforms that may be used is given by the U.S. 
Information Sharing and Analysis Centers (ISACS): 
 
“a secure database, analytic tools, and information gathering and distribution facilities 
designed to allow authorized participants to submit either anonymous or attributed reports 
about information security threats, vulnerabilities, incidents and solutions.”36 
 
Thus we need  
• Information storage. (Servers and Databases) 
• Analysis tools (Often ordinary computers running specialised software) 
• Communications (e.g. VPN over the Internet) 
 
When discussing security in connection to computer system the following aspects are usually 
mentioned: 
 
• Confidentiality 
Keeping information secret. Avoiding unauthorised disclosure of information. 
• Integrity  
No unauthorised alteration of the information, e.g. it should not be possible to insert a false 
message. 
• Authentication  
Verification that a user or system is who they claim to be, e.g. by password. 
• Availability   
That the information can be accessed by authorised actors when needed Denial of Service 
attacks impact on availability 
• Non-repudiation. 
Activities can not falsely be denied afterwards, e.g. the transmission or reception of a 
message. 
• Access Control 
There is usually a complicated situation regarding which user has access to what 
information. Access control ensures that users only access information they are authorised 
to access. 
• Accountability 
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System audits with regards to actions affecting security should be possible 
 
When building a system from scratch for a private or public actor for its internal needs it is not too 
difficult to ensure that all the parts are compliant with the aspects listed above, there are numerous 
standards37 and policies to use, e.g. to avoid using wireless communications. The basic building blocks 
such as PKI and Certificates are widely available. For extra sensitive information standards such as 
Emissions Security regulations (Tempest) may come into play, where it has to be ensured that spurious 
electromagnetic emissions can not be detected from a distance e.g. be used to reconstruct the 
information being presented on a computer screen. 
 
The issue becomes somewhat more difficult when the time comes to connect separate organisations in 
an information exchange network. To seamlessly, and more importantly securely, connect the systems 
of separate organisations is often not possible as it likely would require a common security 
infrastructure.38 The solution will often be to on top of existing equipment add a completely new 
system what will be common to all partners. In some cases where the information sharing does not 
consist of too sensitive information and is simple in form or shape it will often suffice to simply add a 
new software system on top of existing applications.39 For more sensitive information there may be a 
need also for new hardware shared between all the partners and running in parallel to the systems used 
for the partners’ normal business practises. 
 
3.3 Applications and Mobility 
In this last chapter we briefly mention some mixed issues relating to information exchange, topics 
perhaps not that important but nevertheless included here to try to provide a fuller picture.   
 
Depending on context the image that is conjured up when talking about “information exchange” will 
vary significantly.   
 
If it is the government that needs access to information, e.g. about a public infrastructure, that is stored 
in a database owned by a private company that manages the infrastructure then we might see a deep 
technical integration between the two organisations and large amounts of data being transferred, 
possibly without any manual intervention at the private part.  
 
If it instead is a question of a network such as a CERT then there will be a wide variety of ad-hoc 
information exchanges taking place, using phone, video-conferences, e-mails and file-sharing. There 
will also be both secured and open web-portals used for distribution of alerts and also for general 
public awareness raising. 
 
A close knit security expert network, with no particular task other than to provide each other with 
instant support and advice might rely exclusively on encrypted e-mail and encrypted cellular-phone40 
conversations (and file sharing over the same). This leads to an emerging topic, mobile collaboration41, 
where those sharing information are not locked to a specific workplace for doing their job. 
 
                                                 
37 See for example ISO/IEC 17799:2005 Information technology - Security techniques - Code of practice for information 
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38 Although some proof of concept experiments that might help public partners interconnect are ongoing using Service 
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39 See for example PGP for secure e-mail or Microsoft Groove for more advanced file sharing.  
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UE classifications.  
41 See for example Lyn Bartram, Michael Blackstock Designing Portable Collaborative Networks ACM Queue vol. 1, no. 
3 - May 2003. http://www.acmqueue.org/modules.php?name=Content&pa=showpage&pid=35 
This type of collaboration, flexible instead of centralised, presents interesting technical challenges, 
security and otherwise. 
 
When working outside the premises of the home organisation connectivity will be variable both in 
bandwidth and in its presence and will of course risk being compromised security wise, presenting a 
threat not only to the exchanged information but to the terminal itself.  
 
This will also in the cases where the collaboration involves more than simple message exchanges 
necessitate local data replication of sensitive information, with associated security and consistency 
issues. Other possible issues are the remote authentication both of user and terminal, the need for 
dynamic presentation adaption (adapted to variable bandwidth and changes in presentation equipment, 
e.g. switching from notebook to cellular phone), and dynamic session maintenance when switching 
access networks, e.g. from a WLAN to UMTS. 
 
We can end this report with one last reflection: “technical” and “soft” issues are in reality inseparable, 
we may have separated them in this report for convenience but in reality they continuously impact on 
and drive the evolution of each other. New tools, such as those tools that support the interconnection of 
cross sector and cross-nation organisations, the sharing and processing of vast amounts of data, and 
those tools now enabling individuals to collaborate also when on the move will impact on business 
models, processes, legal and regulatory frameworks, and the ways partnerships such as those we’ve 
been reflecting on in this paper are organised, and all of these factors will in turn help drive the 
technical development further. In short; new opportunities will continuously appear, as will new 
obstacles to be overcome. 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
When planning a partnership or network there will be a series of context dependent questions that need 
to be answered. These questions may include; goals, projected membership, information categories. 
 
Of particular interest for information exchange is to be completely clear on legal issues and the issues 
of trust. If a partnership/network is not carefully engineered to foster trust amongst the participants 
(and in its output), then whatever information that is shared will, just as the partnership itself, be of 
limited value. 
 
To ensure a workable partnership, and also to promote trust, there are a number of obstacles to 
overcome. Some of these obstacles are technical in nature, such as ensuring that the security of the 
chosen technical platforms is adequate for its needs, and that common terminologies are applied to the 
shared information. Other obstacles are less tangible but just as important and include topics such as 
reciprocity and each partner’s internal procedures for handling sensitive information. 
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